DATA SUMMARY

LOCATION

Date and time	**Thursday, 6 January 2011; at 21:57 UTC**[1]
Site	**Alicante Airport (LEAL)**

AIRCRAFT

Registration	**EI-EFX**
Type and model	**BOEING 737-800**
Operator	**Ryanair**

Engines

Type and model	**CFM 56-7B26**
Number	**2**

CREW

	Pilot in command	Copilot
Age	**47 years old**	**22 years old**
Licence	**ATPL(A)**	**CPL(A)**
Total flight hours	**14,335:19 h**	**2,300 h**
Flight hours on the type	**6,326:04 h**	**2,050 h**

INJURIES

	Fatal	Serious	Minor/None
Crew			**6**
Passengers			**166**
Third persons			**2**

DAMAGE

Aircraft	**None**
Third parties	**None**

FLIGHT DATA

Operation	**Commercial air transport – Scheduled – International – Passenger**
Phase of flight	**Approach and landing**

REPORT

Date of approval	**24 October 2012**

[1] All times in this report are in UTC unless otherwise specified. To obtain local time, add 1 hour to UTC.

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1. Description of event

A Ryanair Boeing 737-800, registration EI-EFX and callsign RYR54WP, was flying from East Midlands (EGNX) to Alicante (LEAL) with a total of 174 persons onboard: 166 passengers, 2 flight crew (hereinafter "crew"), 4 flight attendants (FA) and 2 flight crew in transit. Approach control cleared it for the VOR Z approach to runway 28 at the Alicante Airport (LEAL), which the crew executed. Meteorological conditions were CAVOK and the crew was able to see the runway several miles before the landing. At 21:57, the aircraft landed on runway 28 and followed a marshaller[2] to the corresponding parking stand. The controller in the Alicante tower asked the marshaller not to park the aircraft until its crew contacted him. The crew contacted the controller, who informed them that they had landed without clearance, a fact they were unaware of and for which they apologized.

The aircraft was undamaged and both the crew and passengers were unhurt.

1.2. Crew information

1.2.1. *Personnel information*

The captain, a 47-year old Dutch national, had a valid and in force JAR-FCL airline transport pilot license (ATPL) with a valid B737 300-900 rating. He also had valid class 1 and 2 medical certificates. He had a total of 14,335:19 flight hours, of which 6,326:04 had been on the type.

The copilot, a 22-year old British national, had a valid and in force JAR-FCL commercial pilot license (CPL) with a valid and in force B737 300-900 rating. He also had valid class 1 medical certificate. He had a total of 2,300 flight hours, of which 2,050 had been on the type.

Both had a level-6 English language competency certificate and had taken the training courses approved for the operator according to EU OPS.

1.2.2. *Crew's statement*

Based on the report filed and on the interviews of the crew, the flight had been normal and routine. The pilot flying was the copilot. They were cleared by Valencia approach

[2] TOAM in Spanish (abbreviation of Movement Area Operation Technician), also known as "marshallers" (signalmen) and "yellows".

control to make a VOR Z approach to runway 28 at the Alicante Airport. They were the last aircraft arriving at the airport and at that time there were no other communications on the radio. The crew stated that they did not recall being transferred to the tower frequency, and that if they had been, they had not acknowledged the transfer, and thus ATC should have taken additional steps. Perhaps because no other communications could be heard and because the weather was good with good visibility, with the runway in sight several miles before landing, the crew subconsciously assumed that they were clear to land. It was only after landing that they realized that the active frequency selected was still the approach frequency and that at no time had they contacted the tower. They subsequently contacted the tower to apologize and asked for a telephone number they could call later to explain what had happened. The controller denied this request, stating that he was under military supervision.[3]

The captain said that there was no item in the checklists involving "Cleared to land", though in accordance with the airline's SOP[4], once this clearance is received the crew turns on the landing lights. This is the last item on the landing checklist, the completion of which was confirmed by the copilot. In this case, said lights were not turned on, perhaps, according to the captain, due to a momentary distraction, though he could not provide a specific reason for this omission. Once on the ground and behind the marshaller's vehicle, the crew realized that the landing lights were not on. This was also when they realized that they had not contacted the tower, after which they noticed that the active communications frequency was that of approach. ATC also informed them that they had unsuccessfully attempted to contact the aircraft on the emergency frequency (121.5 MHz). It was then that the crew realized that the frequency selected on their second VHF transceiver was that of the ATIS[5] broadcast and that the volume was turned down so as to avoid distractions. The crew reported that before and during the descent, the second VHF unit is normally used to listen to the ATIS information and to talk to Operations personnel on the ground if necessary.

1.3. Aircraft information

1.3.1. *General information*

The aircraft, registration EI-EFX, is a Boeing 737-8AS, serial number 35019. It has a maximum authorized weight of 66,990 kg and is equipped with two CFM 56-7B26 engines. The aircraft had valid an in force registration and airworthiness certificates. It also had the corresponding insurance and noise limitation certificates.

[3] The military oversight of civil air traffic control operations resulted from the declaration of a "state of alarm" by the Spanish government, which was in effect from 4 December 2010 until 15 January 2011.
[4] SOP – Standard Operating Procedure.
[5] ATIS – Automatic Terminal Information Service.

Figure 1. Photograph of the aircraft[6]

1.4. Meteorological information

The weather conditions at the Alicante Airport on 6 January between 21:30 and 22:00 were good, with calm winds, clear skies and horizontal visibility in excess of 10,000 m. The QNH was 1,015 mb at both times, the temperature between 10 and 11 °C and the dew point between 9° and 11 °C.

1.5. Aerodrome information

The Alicante Airport (LEAL) is located 9 km southwest of the city and is at an elevation of 142 ft. It has one 3,000-meter long runway in a 28/10 orientation. Runway 28 has a VOR approach (see Appendix A).

1.6. Air Traffic Services

1.6.1. *ATC communications*

Appendix B includes the most relevant communications that took place between the aircraft and the various ATC stations: VALENCIA TACC (Valencia Terminal Area) and ALC TWR (Alicante tower), as well as the hotline conversations between controllers at both stations.

[6] Image taken from www.planespotters.net.

1.6.2. *ATC Status Log and the flight progress strip*

The Operational Status Log of the Alicante Airport contained an entry at 21:57 that read, "RYR54WP lands without clearance despite being called on 118.15 and the emergency frequency 121.5. Pilot admits mistake".

The flight progress strip had been automatically generated in the tower at 21:08.

1.6.3. *Statement from controller on duty at the Alicante TWR*

In his report, the controller stated that the aircraft had been cleared for a VOR approach to LEAL by Valencia approach (Valencia TACC). The aircraft did not acknowledge contacting the tower on 118.15 MHz. The aircraft was called on that frequency and on the emergency 121.5 MHz band, but no reply was received. The controller stated that the airplane had landed without clearance and followed the marshaller's car, though the controller instructed the marshaller not to park the airplane because he wanted to speak to the pilot. Once the airplane was on the ground and before parking in the stand, the controller said that the pilot called on 120.4 MHz, which was the Valencia approach frequency, and was told to contact the Alicante tower on 118.15 MHz. The controller then explained to the pilot that they had landed without clearance, for which the pilot apologized.

1.6.4. *Statement from controller on duty at the Valencia TACC*

The approach controller reported that the aircraft called on the TACC frequency and was instructed to descend to FL180. When in the vicinity of the airport, the crew reported being in contact with the ground and requested to fly straight in. The aircraft was cleared to fly to mile 15 and continue descending at its own discretion in contact with the ground. After crossing the coastline, and after coordinating with the tower, it was cleared to mile 8 and to make a VOR Z approach direct to runway 28. The aircraft reported that it would call when established. After a few minutes, believing that he had transferred communications to the tower, the controller noticed that he had not removed the flight progress strip, so he called the tower to see if the aircraft had called. The tower informed him that the aircraft was already on the ground.

1.6.5. *Letter of Agreement between TACC and TWR*

According to the letter of agreement between the two stations, the basic flight plan information will normally be available in both ATS stations. Every message, including updated flight plan information, is to be sent from the transferring station to the

appropriate sector/position of the accepting station via the SACTA[7] system or via telephone.

According to item E.2.1.1 of Appendix E to this Letter of Agreement titled "Transfer of Control and Transfer of Communications", "Valencia TACC will transfer arriving IFR transit communications to Alicante TWR no closer than 10 NM from the threshold of the runway in use. Alicante TWR will notify Valencia TACC if radio contact has not been established with the inbound aircraft prior to 5 NM DME from the threshold of the runway in use".

1.7. Flight recorders

The information on the CVR and DFDR[8] recorders was unavailable since it was not saved by the crew after the incident.

The data from the QAR[9] were available but provided no useful information to the investigation.

1.8. Operational information

1.8.1. *Frequencies utilized*

The aircraft has two VHF communications (COM) units. According to Part A of the airline's Operations Manual[10], the COM1 unit is to be selected to the ATC frequency and COM2 is to be selected to the 121.5 MHz emergency frequency, unless it is needed for another purpose, in which case it is to be returned to 121.5 MHz when it is no longer needed for said other purpose. In this case, COM1 was tuned to the Valencia TACC frequency and COM2 to the ATIS frequency, though the volume was turned down.

The operator confirmed that the COM2 is used for a purpose other than monitoring the emergency frequency (121.5 MHz) primarily during the cruise phase. It also noted that the emergency frequency is often used improperly, thus stripping it of its intended value as a "silent servant". That is why the volume on the COM2 unit is often turned down, so as to minimize crew distractions caused by conversations that are held on that frequency and reduce the real risk of losing a call on the operational frequency selected on COM1.

[7] SACTA – Automated Air Traffic Control System.
[8] CVR – Cockpit Voice Recorder.
DFDR – Digital Flight Data Recorder.
[9] QAR Quick Access Recorder.
[10] Items 8.3.0.1.11 ATC Communications and 12.1.2.5 Radio Listening Watch.

1.8.2. *Checklists*

The landing checklist that the crew must complete as part of the normal checks included in the FCOM[11] is as follows:

LANDING < RYR >
START SWITCHES . . . . . CONT
RECALL . . . . . CHECKED
SPEEDBRAKE . . . . . ARMED, GREEN LIGHT
LANDING GEAR . . . . . DOWN, 3 GREEN
AUTOBRAKE . . . . . ___ SET
FLAPS . . . . . ___ , GREEN LIGHT
LANDING LIGHTS . . . . . ON

Although not specifically stated, the operator reported that a crew does not perform the last step until it has ATC clearance to land. In this case, this clearance was not requested and the landing lights were not energized.

1.9. Information about the use of emergency channel

During the preparation of this report, it has been known that there is a tendency of some crews to use the emergency channel with different purposes to those it has been conceived. Eurocontrol has already warned through two Safety Alerts[12] of this bad pratice, the last one was related to the "chats" maintained so as to comment the development of the recent EURO 2012 football championship.

Appendix C of this report shows the relevant ICAO Annex 10 text (Aeronautical Telecommunications) where the information regarding the emergency channel is included.

2. ANALYSIS

On 6 January 2011, the aircraft was flying from East Midlands (EGNX) to Alicante (LEAL) with a total of 174 persons onboard. The crew was making the VOR Z approach to runway 28 at the Alicante Airport (LEAL) (see Appendix A). According to the ATC communications transcript (see Appendix B), the crew of the aircraft contacted approach control (Valencia TACC) at flight level 350 at 21:31:21. Approach control notified the crew of radar contact and cleared them to descend to FL 190. Later, at 21:47:58, after more clearances to descend, the crew informed Valencia TACC that it was approaching

[11] FCOM – Flight Crew Operations Manual.
[12] http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Guarding_121.5_MHz.

the last authorized flight level (FL 80) and asked about the possibility of flying direct to mile 8. Valencia TACC cleared them to descend to 5,000 ft in visual contact with the ground, supplied the QNH and initially cleared them to mile 15, all of which the crew acknowledged. Valencia TACC then contacted the Alicante TWR and asked if it could pass them RYR54WP at the 8-mile point. TWR replied in the affirmative. Valencia TACC then contacted the aircraft and cleared it direct to mile 8 for an approach to runway 28 and to descend at its discretion. The crew acknowledged the clearance and concluded by saying "I'll call you established". There were no further communications between the crew and this station until, with the aircraft on the ground and unable to be guided to parking, the crew called on the frequency selected on COM1 (which was that of the Valencia TACC) to find out the reason. Valencia TACC then transferred them to the Alicante TWR. As a result, the investigation has concluded that the crew was not aware that it had landed without clearance until it was prohibited from parking and, upon asking for the reason on the radio, noticed that they were still selected to the approach (Valencia TACC) frequency.

Neither party made any efforts to establish communications. The aircraft continued its approach with the approach frequency selected on COM1 and the ATIS information frequency on COM2 with the volume turned down. According to company procedures, COM2 should be tuned to the emergency frequency (121.5 MHz) unless required for other purposes, such as checking ATIS information, though once done it should be returned to the emergency frequency. The company explained that it is routine practice to lower the volume on COM2 since the constant communications that are usually present on this emergency channel can distract the crew. Company procedures, however, explicitly require selecting this frequency on COM2 and to monitor communications on this frequency. Had ATC stations attempted to contact the aircraft in the event of a dangerous situation or potential conflict, this would not have been possible. A safety recommendation is issued in this regard.

In the same way, it has been known there is a tendency of some crews to use the emergency channel with different purposes to those it has been conceived. Eurocontrol has issued two Safety Alerts[13] on the subject, the last one recently published, relating to the chats held between crews to comment the development of the recent EURO 2012 football championship.

Item 4.1.3.1.1 in ICAO Annex 10 volume V establishes that that the emergency channel (121.5 MHz) shall be used only for genuine emergency purposes. Taking into account point 2.4, it is the responsibility of States to watch over the appropriate use of frequencies and to ensure that there is no deliberate transmission of unnecessary or anonymous signals, messages or data by any station within that State. This is the reason why it is considered necessary to issue a safety recommendation in this regard to EASA,

[13] http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Guarding_121.5_MHz.

AESA and ATS providers so as to disseminate among the aeronautic community the need of using the emergency frequency in the terms it was conceived.

As per the requirements of item E.2.2.1 in Appendix E to the Letter of Agreement between the Valencia TACC and the Alicante TWR, Valencia will transfer arriving IFR transit communications to Alicante TWR no closer than 10 NM from the threshold of the runway in use. Alicante TWR will notify Valencia TACC if radio contact has not been established with the inbound aircraft prior to 5 NM DME from the threshold of the runway in use.

Valencia TACC did not transfer the aircraft to the Alicante tower frequency. After asking the TWR if they could transfer the aircraft at mile 8 and receiving a positive reply, the TACC instructed the aircraft to proceed to mile 8 without informing the crew of which frequency to contact, possibly because the TACC was expecting another report since the crew finished its acknowledgment by saying "I'll report established". The transfer was not made in this communication or afterwards despite being in radar contact with the aircraft, meaning the aircraft was on the controller's screen the entire time. The transfer was not made on the approach frequency (which was selected throughout the entire process) or on the emergency frequency. As a result, the investigation has concluded that the Valencia TACC controller was not aware until after the fact that the aircraft had landed, and thus there was no reaction as might have been necessary in the event of a potential conflict, viewing that due to the crew's failure to change the frequency, the only way to contact the aircraft would have been through the approach frequency. According to the Letter of Agreement, the Alicante TWR should have called Valencia TACC when it failed to establish radio contact with the aircraft before it was within 5 NM DME of the threshold of the runway in use.

Weather conditions were CAVOK and the crew sighted the runway several miles before landing. The crew may have subconsciously thought they were cleared for landing because they had been cleared direct to mile 8 by Valencia TACC and to descend at their discretion, and because the good weather conditions made it possible for them to see the sequence of landing aircraft. On the ground the crew noticed that the landing lights were off. Turning on the landing lights is the last item performed as part of the normal landing checklist, and is supposedly to be performed after the landing clearance is received, though this is not specifically stated on the checklist. The conclusion is that the normal checklist was not completed. It seems logical that an action or indication (as in this case, the landing clearance) that triggers the start of a checklist should be clearly and explicitly stated, such that the actions included in the list can be completed without interruption. A safety recommendation is issued in this regard.

At 21:57, the aircraft landed on runway 28 and was cleared by the TWR controller to follow a marshaller's car to the corresponding parking stand. Since the TWR had not attempted to contact the aircraft prior to the landing either on the tower or on the emergency frequency, and since the flight progress strip had been generated at 21:08

and the TWR controller was aware of this aircraft's imminent arrival, it follows that the TWR controller was also unaware that the aircraft had landed without clearance, which confirms that he had a mistaken impression of the actual conditions present in and around the airport, a situation that could have posed a risk to operations. A safety recommendation is issued in this regard.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND CAUSES

3.1. Findings

- The crew had valid and in force licenses and medical certificates.
- The aircraft's documentation was valid and the aircraft was airworthy.
- While on approach to the airport, the crew asked Valencia TACC if they could fly directly to mile 8.
- The Valencia TACC controller asked the TWR controller about transferring the aircraft at mile 8.
- The TWR controller accepted.
- The Valencia TACC controller cleared the aircraft direct to mile 8 at the crew's discretion.
- The crew acknowledged and concluded saying "I'll report established".
- Although it was nighttime, weather conditions were good and allowed the crew to sight the runway several miles before landing.
- The Valencia TACC controller did not inform the crew of the frequency on which to contact the airport.
- The TACC controller may have been subconsciously awaiting the last call from the aircraft reporting established.
- The crew had the Valencia TACC frequency on COM1 and the ATIS frequency on COM2, though with the volume turned down.
- The crew reduced the volume on COM2 mentioning that this emergency frequency is used as a chat in some occasions
- Eurocontrol has warned about the inappropriate use of the emergency channel by some crews.
- The crew subconsciously believed they had been transferred and were cleared to land.
- The crew did not complete the last item on the landing checklist (turn on the landing lights), which is done after the landing clearance is received from ATC.
- The Letter of Agreement between the stations regulates how aircraft are transferred from the Valencia TACC to the Alicante TWR under normal conditions.
- At no time did the Valencia TACC controller contact the aircraft prior to landing.
- The Valencia TACC controller was not aware of the aircraft's flight path or its crew's intentions until after it landed.
- The aircraft's flight progress strip had been generated in the tower at 21:08.
- From that moment on, the TWR controller was aware that this aircraft would be inbound.

- The Letter of Agreement between stations stipulates that the Alicante TWR must notify Valencia TACC if it fails to establish contact with the aircraft.
- The TWR controller did not attempt to contact Valencia TACC.
- The TWR controller did not attempt to contact the aircraft before landing.
- The TWR controller did not realize that he had not cleared the aircraft to land until he was told by Valencia TACC and the aircraft was already on the ground.

3.2. Causes

The incident was caused by the crew's failure to request landing clearance, believing subconsciously they already had this clearance, and by the deficient supervision and monitoring by the ATC stations involved (Valencia TACC and ALC TWR), which became aware of the aircraft's landing only after the fact.

4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

The aircraft landed on runway 28 at the Alicante Airport without clearance and without any of the parties involved (aircraft crew, Valencia TACC controller and Alicante Airport TWR controller) being aware of this fact. The deficiencies found during the analysis regarding the use and monitoring of the communications frequencies, the use of checklists, and those encountered in the communications, procedures and monitoring of the control stations, make it necessary to issue the following safety recommendations:

REC 69/12. It is recommended that RYANAIR revise its procedures so as to explicitly include a prohibition to lower the volume on the frequency selected on the communications 2 (COM2) unit.

REC 70/12. It is recommended that EASA disseminate among operators and ATS providers under its responsibility the need of using the emergency frequency in the terms it was conceived.

REC 71/12. It is recommended that AESA disseminate among operators and ATS providers under its responsibility the need of using the emergency frequency in the terms it was conceived.

REC 72/12. It is recommended that AENA disseminate among its departments the need of using the emergency frequency in the terms it was conceived.

REC 73/12. It is recommended that SAERCO disseminate among its departments the need of using the emergency frequency in the terms it was conceived.

REC 74/12. It is recommended that FERRONATS disseminate among its departments the need of using the emergency frequency in the terms it was conceived.

REC 75/12. It is recommended that INECO disseminate among its departments the need of using the emergency frequency in the terms it was conceived.

REC 76/12. It is recommended that RYANAIR revise its landing checklist so as to explicitly include an item associated with obtaining ATC clearance to land.

REC 77/12. It is recommended that AENA revise its procedures so as to ensure the transfer of an aircraft between ATC stations.

REC 78/12. It is recommended that AENA revise its procedures so as to ensure that all of the ATC stations responsible for an aircraft supervise and monitor its progress.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
LEAL Airport approach chart used and radar trace



OCA/H		A	B	C	D
STA	2.5%	540 (500)			
En circuito (H) sobre 142		960 (820)	1090 (950)	1240 (1100)	1370 (1230)

GS	kt	80	100	120	140	160	180
FAF-THR:	min:s						
FAF-MAPT: 5.3 NM	min:s	3:59	3:11	2:39	2:16	1:59	1:46
ROD: 5.4 %	ft/min	439	549	658	768	878	988

ALT/HGT DME (ALT) FNA											
13 DME	12 DME	11 DME	10 DME	9 DME	8 DME	7 DME	6 DME	5 DME	4 DME	3 DME	2 DME	1 DME
						1880 (1840)	1550 (1510)	1220 (1180)	890 (850)	560 (520)		


06/01/2011 21:56:22
Datos Plan vuelo
RYR54WP B738 H/L/S 360 460
EGNX LEAL 0 VLC1N
28
Ruta
Sectores
Sect.Ope.
ANETO TURBO GRAUS LOBAR
SEROX CASPE MLA CRETA SAURA
PLANA VLC V16937 POLOP ALTT
RUTA
Datos de pista
Cssr: 2215 Pos. X/Y: -103,8/-102,0
Vel.: 16 Sector: TWALI
Sect.Ope.: TWALI
C
Lat.: 38 16 41 N Long.: 00 31 45 W
Indicativo: RYR54WP Vel. Z: -681
Est. Emerg.: NOE Nivel: 3
Calidad: A Est. flat: G Est.pres.: S
Est. ac: N Est. aep_ae: N Est. aep_am: N
ALT
RYR54WP
3
16HAL

APPENDIX B
ATC communications

Communications between the aircraft and the various ATC stations

1. VAL TACC (Valencia Terminal Area Control Center)

Time	Station	Text
21:31:21	RYR54WP	Valencia, Ryanair Five Four Whisky Papa, flight level Three-Five-Zero
21:31:26	TACC VAL	Ryanair Five Four Whisky Papa, Buenas noches, radar contact, descend flight level One-Nine-Zero.
21:31:32	RYR54WP	One-Nine-Zero, Ryanair Five Four Whisky Papa
21:39:10	RYR54WP	Ryanair Five Four Whisky Papa, Level One-Nine-Zero, standing by for lower
21:39:14	TACC VAL	Ryanair Five Four Whisky Papa, descend flight level One-Three-Zero
21:39:20	RYR54WP	Level One-Three-Zero, Ryanair Five Four Whisky Papa
21:39:47	TACC VAL	Ryanair Five Four Whisky Papa, descend flight level Eight-Zero
21:39:46	RYR54WP	Flight level Eight-Zero, Ryanair Five Four Whisky Papa
21:47:58	RYR54WP	Ryanair Five Four Whisky Papa approaching flight level Eight-Zero. Clear of terrain. Is there any chance to direct 8 mile?
21:48:06	TACC VAL	Ryanair Five Four Whisky Papa, in contact with the ground descend 5,000 ft, QNH 1,015 and initially proceed to the One-Five DME6 from final
21:48:17	RYR54WP	Descend 5,000, 1,015 until 15 mile fix, runway 28, Ryanair Five Four Whisky Papa
21:49:47	TACC VAL	Are you OK with the Ryanair at mile eight?*
21:49:51	TWR ALC	Yes, give it to me*
21:49:52	TACC VAL	Thanks*
21:50:06	TACC VAL	Ryanair Five Four Whisky Papa, fly now to the 8 DME fix on final, in contact with the ground and cleared straight in VOR approach, runway 28, descend on your discretion, QNH 1,015
21:50:19	RYR54WP	At our own discretion descend, QNH 1,015 and 8 mile, thank you very much for the straight in few miles in approach, runway 28, I'll call you established
21:51:16	TACC VAL	OTHER COMMUNICATIONS
21:51:21	ANE8828	
21:58:12	TACC VAL	
21:58:17	FTL801	
21:58:28	IBE801	
21:58:34	TACC VAL	
21:58:43	IBE801	
21:58:57	TACC VAL	Are you there?*
21:58:58	TWR ALC	What is it?*

Time	Station	Text
21:59:01	TACC VAL	The Ryanair's safely on the ground, right?*
21:59:03	TWR ALC	Yes, sorry, What frequency did you transfer him to me on?*
21:59:06	TACC VAL	Thing is I didn't transfer him, he transferred himself*
21:59:12	TACC VAL	Did he call you?*
21:59:14	TWR ALC	No
21:59:15	TACC VAL	He landed without clearance?*
21:59:20	TWR ALC	Affirmative*
21:59:21	TACC VAL	The nerve. Are you goint to report it?*
21:59:24	TWR ALC	Off course*
21:59:25	TACC VAL	Ok*

* Original conversation in Spanish.

2. TWR ALC (Alicante tower)

Time	Freq.	Station	Text
21:57:37	118.150	TWR	RYR54WP turn right and follow marshall to the appron
21:57:58	118.150	TWR	RYR54WP...?
21:58:11	118.150	TWR	RYR54WP...?
21:58:24	121.500	TWR	RYR54WP Calling on guard, do you read?
21:58:39	121.500	TWR	RYR54WP...?
21:58:56	LC	LECL	Are you there?*
21:58:58	LC	TWR	Yes, go ahead*
21:59:00	LC	LECL	The RYR is safely on the ground, right?*
21:59:03	LC	TWR	Yes, sorry, What frequency did you transfer him to me on?*
21:59:06	LC	LECL	None, he transferred himself*
21:59:10	LC	LECL	Did he call you?*
21:59:11	LC	TWR	No*
21:59:15	LC	LECL	He landed without clearance?*
21:59:18	LC	TWR	Affirmative**
21:59:20	LC	LECL	The nerve. Are you going to report it?
21:59:22	LC	TWR	Off course*
21:59:25	LC	LECL	Ok*
21:59:35	118.150	TWR	RYR54WP...?*

Time	Freq.	Station	Text
22:00:57	118.150	TWR	Yellow, tower*
22:01:00	118.150	Follow me	Yellow, tower*
22:01:03	118.150	TWR	Don't park the RYAN, please, don't take him to his stand. I'm calling the pilot, they landed without clearance and he's not answering, so don't hook him up to the jetway until he calls me*
22:01:14	118.150	Follow me	Copy, we'll stop the car at the stand then and he can stop the airplane until he talks to you*
22:01:20	118.150	TWR	Correct*
22:01:46	118.150	TWR	RYR54WP...
22:01:57	118.150	RYR8533	Alicante RYR8533 request start up and clearence to Madrid
22:02:07	118.150	TWR	8523, start up and push back approved, and please, could you call your company and say someone in your company can call me, please? the region or something like that
22:02:18	118.150	RYR8533	Ok, we'll try
22:04:16	118.150	RYR54WP	Tower, RYR54WP...
22:04:18	118.150	TWR	RYR54WP, go ahead
22:04:20	118.150	RYR54WP (F/O)	We reached our stand without... We just wait for the marshaller... Would you define the problem?
22:04:32	118.150	TWR	The problem is you have landed without clearence
22:04:35	118.150	RYR54WP	Why?
22:04:40	118.150	RYR54WP	Stand by please...
22:04:44	118.150	TWR	RYR54WP, you never called me, I was calling you on guard and you landed without clearence
22:04:56	118.150	RYR54WP (capt)	TWR... RYR54WP... I totally apologize for that... (garbled) call you...
22:06:04	118.150	TWR	RYR54WP continue with the yellow car now I know who you are because I didn´t know the traffic landing in my airport without clearence, expect the report please
22:06:18	118.150	RYR54WP	RYR54WP we will make the report and we do apologize for this ahhh... not call to you, thank you
22:06:36	118.150	Follow me	Tower, yellow, can we proceed?*
22:06:39	118.150	TWR	Yes, now that I know which airport landed... I mean which airplane landed at the airport, yes*
22:06:44	118.150	Follow me	Roger, thank you. Yes, proceed*
22:07:15	118.150	RYR54WP	TWR, RYR54WP, Could you give us your telephone number to answer and I call you about the flight?
22:07:26	118.150	TWR	Negative sir

Time	Freq.	Station	Text
22:07:47	118.150	TWR	RYR54WP, right now I am under military supervision, if you want to contact with someone you can contact with the colonel
22:08:05	118.150	RYR54WP	Aaah Roger, RYR54WP
22:08:20	118.150	TWR	OTHER COMMUNICATIONS
No time stamp on the transcript	118.150	RYR54WP	TWR, RYR54WP
	118.150	TWR	RYR54WP Go ahead
	118.150	RYR54WP	RYR54WP I sincerely apologize for what happened earlier on and even in any way, can I talk to you or your supervisor there to explain the situation?
	118.150	TWR	RYR54WP, I don´t have any problem, the problem is... I have here with me the military people, the captain right now, and I have to make a report, we are now under military supervision and we have to do it
	118.150	RYR54WP	OK, copied that sir, no problem at all sir, and I will report to my company to explain the situation to them, I promise this will never happen again, Ok, excuse me, I do apologize and... I'll be sure, very good night
	118.150	TWR	Thank you, bye

* Original conversation in Spanish.

APPENDIX C
Information about emergency channel

Item 4.1.3.1 from ICAO Annex 10 (Aeronautical Telecommunications) Volume V (Aeronautical Radio Frequency Spectrum Utilization) establishes:

4.1.3.1 Emergency channel

4.1.3.1.1 The emergency channel (121.5 MHz) shall be used only for genuine emergency purposes, as broadly outlined in the following:

a) to provide a clear channel between aircraft in distress or emergency and a ground station when the normal channels are being utilized for other aircraft;
b) to provide a VHF communication channel between aircraft and aerodromes, not normally used by international air services, in case of an emergency condition arising;
c) to provide a common VHF communication channel between aircraft, either civil or military, and between such aircraft, and surface services, involved in common search and rescue operations, prior to changing when necessary to the appropriate frequency;
d) to provide air-ground communication with aircraft when airborne equipment failure prevents the use of the regular channels;
e) to provide a channel for the operation of emergency locator transmitters (ELTs), and for communication between survival craft and aircraft engaged in search and rescue operations;
f) to provide a common VHF channel for communication between civil aircraft and intercepting aircraft or intercept control units and between civil or intercepting aircraft and air traffic services units in the event of interception of the civil aircraft.

In the same way, Volume II of this Annex establishes:

2.4 Supervision

2.4.1 Each State shall designate the authority responsible for ensuring that the international aeronautical telecommunication service is conducted in accordance with the Procedures in this Annex.
2.4.2 *Recommendation.— Occasional infringements of the Procedures contained herein, when not serious, should be dealt with by direct communication between the parties immediately interested either by correspondence or by personal contact.*
2.4.3 When a station commits serious or repeated infringements, representations relating to them shall be made to the authority designated in 2.4.1 of the State to which the station belongs by the authority which detects them.
2.4.4 *Recommendation.— The authorities designated in 2.4.1 should exchange information regarding the performance of systems of communication, radio navigation, operation and maintenance, unusual transmission phenomena, etc.*

2.5 Superfluous transmissions

Each State shall ensure that there is no wilful transmission of unnecessary or anonymous signals, messages or data by any station within that State.